A new report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict:
“explores the consequences of Jokowi’s lack of interest in keeping the military in check and what the consequences could be if Prabowo, now a candidate for president, is elected in 2024.
The backsliding on civilian control has involved opening up more and more civilian positions to active-duty officers, replacing civilian defence ministers and many of their subordinates with retired officers, expanding the TNI’s non-military roles, expanding its territorial command structure, and failing to subject military budgets and procurement procedures to close scrutiny.
These developments have often served Jokowi’s interests of building a circle of trusted allies, expanding his political coalition, and encouraging faster and more efficient infrastructure development. He has been aided in his reliance on the military by the TNI’s generally positive image among the Indonesian public.
The report notes that while the interests of the TNI as an institution and Prabowo Subianto as Defence Minister and political candidate do not always coincide – indeed are often at odds – Prabowo as president could seek to further expand the military budget, territorial commands, and some internal security functions. He is on record as advocating an increase in the number of regional military commands from the current 15 to 38 – meaning one in every province.
Under the circumstances, the report notes, the most effective check on military power will lie in the national parliament and a strong political opposition.”
Paul Staniland 