Month: March 2024

This is a great piece by Paul Musgrave on the problems that have been created by the discursive dominance of “STEM.” Some excerpts:

-“Non-STEM disciplines must continually validate and justify their existence in ways that never occurs to STEM participants. If I were to assert that political science majors demonstrably out-earn biology majors, for instance, you’d think I was stark raving mad—but no, it is so. Political science majors similarly out-earn chemistry majors, and all three pale before econ majors.2 Yet even economics is not STEM, although it’s probably the most STEM-adjacent social science, and as such has no acronymic umbrella to shelter it.”

– “Students who have learned since preschool to identify planets and atoms are not introduced to similar vocabularies for understanding their society. “Interests”, “institutions”, “identities”, “norms”, “structures”, and the like are in fact real terms with real (if contested!) meanings that correspond to real phenomena in the world.3

Please bear in mind that I’m not talking about the value of the humanities. You may be eager to read this as yet another “oh the humanities!” plea. Don’t. This isn’t about the humanities. This is about the social sciences: the systematic study of and organized understanding of human activity and behavior, something as hostile to the spirit of humanistic inquiry as the study of electrons.”

– “Or, to finally bring us back full circle, it’s a calibration of institutions back to the tastes and preferences of one class—not, in this case, a revolutionary one, but the alliance of sensible centrists and C-suite denizens who define so much conventional wisdom. That’s not a coalition that Lenin would have dealt with (well, you know what I mean), but functionally it serves the same role: progress and productivity are fine, but challenges and critique are not.”

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program tracks armed conflict and produces valuable annual overviews in the Journal of Peace Research (as well as ongoing data on their website, including charts I often use for teaching). There are important caveats about these data and various categories of conflict and coding that need to be kept in mind (information here), but I find them extremely useful in getting a sense of where the most violent conflicts are and how they are trending.

Their 2023 summary (Davies, Pettersson, and Oberg 2023) makes for some grim reading, which I suspect will not get any better when they release their 2024 summary later this year. Though policy interest in civil wars/internal conflict has markedly decreased, they remain extremely common and important, while classical interstate conflict is also reemerging as relevant.

Some of the key findings:

• “In 2022, fatalities from organized violence increased by a staggering 97%, compared to the previous year, from 120,000 in 2021 to 237,000 in 2022, making 2022 the deadliest year since the Rwandan genocide in 1994”
• “We have witnessed an emerging trend of increased conflict between states in the last decade, including cases where major powers support opposite sides in internationalized intrastate conflict”
• A chart of the number of conflicts:

• A chart of the number of fatalities in state-based conflicts (i.e. government vs. rebels/factions):

• The continued dominance of Intrastate and Internationalized Intrastate conflicts among global conflict, though interstate wars continue to exist and matter:

• There is not great news on the “non-state conflict” front (i.e. conflicts among social groups, cartels, etc) either: “While the number of active conflicts increased from 76 in 2021, the fatalities caused by these conflicts decreased from more than 25,000 in 2021 to at least 21,100 in 2022. Yet, 2022 was one of the five most deadly years in non-state conflict since 1989, and the past nine years have witnessed unprecedented levels of non-state violence, as shown in Figure 4. Violence in Mexico and Syria has been driving this trend.”

1. Angshuman Choudhury on India’s (partially/potentially) changing approach to Myanmar in The Diplomat: “Vanlalvena’s meeting with the AA, which couldn’t have happened without some degree of approval from the federal government in India, shows that the needle might be shifting in New Delhi. There is now a subtle but certain recognition in parts of the Indian political and security establishments that the SAC is losing Myanmar rapidly. This is especially true for western Myanmar – Rakhine and Chin States – where the AA, Chin National Front/Army (CNF/A) and other Chin armed groups have made sweeping territorial gains since October when the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched coordinated offensives against junta targets in the north.”
2. Asfandyar Mir and Andrew Watkins on regional engagement with the Taliban in Foreign Affairs: “Two and a half years into Taliban rule, however, the United States has little to show for this approach. For one thing, the Taliban appear to be unmoved by global shaming,. . . . The U.S. approach is also struggling because a growing number of governments, such as China’s, are not treating the Taliban as a pariah regime. . .Nonrecognition is no longer a credible coercive tool, and if the United States seeks to influence Taliban behavior, it must find other ways to achieve its desired aims.”

Students, don’t use ChatGPT for your literature reviews. I asked it to “Compare and contrast Paul Staniland’s two books” since this is a topic I know pretty well. It spit out a detailed analysis that looks quite thoughtful and analytical, but inconveniently happens to include a made-up book I very much never wrote:

“As of my last knowledge update in January 2022, Paul Staniland, a political scientist, had published two notable books: “Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse” (2014) and “Ordering Anarchy: Armies and Leaders in Tacitly Networked Warfare” (2018). I’ll provide a brief overview of each book and then compare and contrast them based on common themes and approaches.

1. Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (2014):
   • Focus: This book delves into the dynamics of insurgent groups, examining the factors that contribute to their cohesion or collapse.
   • Key Themes: Staniland explores the importance of internal organizational structures, leadership dynamics, and external influences in shaping the resilience or fragility of insurgent groups.
   • Methodology: The book draws on extensive fieldwork and case studies from South Asia, particularly in Sri Lanka and India.
2. Ordering Anarchy: Armies and Leaders in Tacitly Networked Warfare (2018):
   • Focus: This book shifts its focus to the role of armies and leaders in tacitly networked warfare, exploring how these entities operate in the absence of clear organizational structures.
   • Key Themes: Staniland examines how military organizations function in environments characterized by ambiguity, fluidity, and informal networks. The book addresses the challenges and strategies of military actors in such contexts.
   • Methodology: Similar to his first book, Staniland employs a mix of qualitative research and case studies, with a particular focus on insurgencies and conflicts.

Comparison:

1. Common Thread of Networks: Both books share a common thread in their exploration of networks, whether it be insurgent networks in the first book or tacitly networked warfare in the second. Staniland is interested in understanding how informal structures and relationships impact conflict dynamics.
2. Focus on South Asia: Both books draw heavily from case studies in South Asia, showcasing Staniland’s expertise in the region. This regional focus allows for in-depth analysis and context-specific insights.
3. Temporal and Spatial Scope: “Networks of Rebellion” primarily deals with insurgencies, while “Ordering Anarchy” broadens the scope to examine military organizations in various conflict settings. The second book, therefore, has a more expansive temporal and spatial scope.

Contrast:

1. Different Analytical Lenses: While both books deal with conflict and networks, they approach the subject from different analytical perspectives. The first book concentrates on insurgent groups, emphasizing their internal dynamics, while the second shifts the focus to military organizations operating in ambiguous environments.
2. Scale of Analysis: “Networks of Rebellion” tends to focus on the micro-level dynamics within insurgent groups, examining their internal structures. In contrast, “Ordering Anarchy” looks at the macro-level challenges faced by military organizations in navigating tacitly networked warfare.

In summary, while both books by Paul Staniland share a thematic emphasis on networks and conflict, they differ in their analytical lenses and the scale at which they examine these issues. The first book is more focused on insurgencies and their internal dynamics, while the second broadens the scope to explore the challenges faced by military organizations in complex conflict environments.”

I am teaching my PLSC 26100/36100 Civil War seminar during the spring quarter of 2024. A draft of the syllabus can be found here.