One of the fascinating big questions of contemporary politics is understanding the nature and intensity of future US-China security/economic competition – are these countries fated to intense competition or is there space for de-escalation? This has big implications for India in particular, which seemed somewhat-comfortably ensconced as a strategic partner of the US in managing China’s rise – until Trumpism hit. A US-China rapprochement might leave India on the outside looking-in as the “G2” set rules of the Asian – and global – order.
Two recent pieces offer different potential answers to how structurally-ordained US-China competition is. Mira Rapp-Hooper in Foreign Affairs writes:
” Despite his attempt to court Xi, and Xi’s own desire to take maximum advantage of Trump’s overtures, any truce will probably be temporary. China is highly unlikely to adjust its global aims, and there are many ways an attempted détente could unravel. Trump and Xi may want to calm the waters in the short term. But structural realities mean that U.S.-Chinese competition is here to stay. . . .
But the laws of international relations are ruthless. No matter what happens at their meeting, China’s ambitions will still pose the same long-term risks to American interests, American allies, and American power. The question is whether the bipartisan architects of Washington’s China consensus will act swiftly enough to protect the system they helped create.”
On the other hand, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, which does the gold-standard polling work on American attitudes toward global issues, is now finding that there has been a major shift in US public opinion toward China; Craig Kafura summarizes key findings:
“the bipartisan embrace of US-China competition no longer holds among the public, with partisan differences in perceived threats from China and disagreements on current US-China trade policy. While Republicans continue to favor limiting China’s rise, as well as reductions in trade, and view US-China trade as detrimental to US national security, Democrats have moved in the other direction. Driven by shifts among Democrats and Independents, a majority of Americans now favor a policy of cooperation and engagement with Beijing, oppose higher tariffs, and oppose cuts to bilateral trade. . . .
Since the first Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy, US-China relations have been defined by the framework of “Great Power Competition.” The administration of President Joe Biden continued this approach, framing its strategy as “invest, align, compete”—investing domestically, aligning with allies and partners, and competing with China—while also cooperating with China where interests might align. The second Trump administration has leaned heavily into the competition side of that approach, imposing high tariffs on Chinese goods and escalating the Biden administration’s attempts to cut China off from high-tech semiconductor imports. Yet the American public is moving in a different direction. The public is moving in favor of cooperation and engagement with Beijing, is less concerned about China’s rise as a threat, and is less likely now to prioritize limiting China’s influence around the world.
In a sharp reversal from 2024, a majority of Americans (53%) now say the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China, while 44 percent prefer a policy of actively limiting the growth of China’s power. This is the first time since 2019 that a majority of Americans have preferred a policy of cooperation and engagement with China.”
Much is to be determined – US public opinion may simply be reacting against whatever Trump is up to, and more responsive to elite cues, partisan swings, etc rather than reflecting a deep, “true” underlying attitudes. But American opinion is worth paying attention to: Washington’s strategic consensus may not represent the public’s.
Paul Staniland 