Zack Cooper has a very sober assessment of the failure of America’s Asia strategy out in Foreign Affairs, one I strongly agree with. He argues that the most plausible strategy that can be cobbled together at this point is a retrenched version of defending the first island chain, rather than a comprehensive pivot into competition across the region.
Most of the piece focuses on East Asia, but there are important implications of this strategy for India and Thailand that I wanted to highlight:
“This approach would trim U.S. commitments while retaining some of the most capable U.S. allies and partners, including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The United States would likely maintain its presence in Australia and South Korea, given its enduring alliances with both countries and its desire to avoid leaving crucial allies out of the U.S. defense perimeter, a costly mistake Washington made ahead of the Korean War. But it would leave most of the rest of the region off the list of U.S. priorities, including the treaty ally Thailand and the emerging great power India. In practice, this could mean, for example, abrogating the U.S. alliance with Thailand and stating explicitly that the United States will not intervene if China encroaches on the territory or maritime claims of partners on the Asian mainland.’”
India can continue making hopeful noises about America as a long-term strategic partner, and I think there is certainly a possibility of that (including in high-tech areas), but it is also the case that the US may be far less useful as a strategic backstop than one might have thought a decade ago.
Paul Staniland 