Author: pstaniland

The editors of the Journal of Civil Wars asked me to reflect on the evolution of the field since I entered graduate school, for the 25th Anniversary Special Issue of the journal. I was happy to do so. The full, open access text can be found here.

I made a few arguments:

• We’ve seen three broad “waves” of civil war research that each was characterized by a particular set of areas of focus. I kind of “grew up” in the second wave, while much of my more recent work has been located in the third wave.
• While there are general characteristics of each wave, the field has been enduringly fragmented across geographic, methodological, unit-of-analysis, and social network divides. These is inevitable but has some downsides; as any European reader will see, for instance, mine is admittedly a fairly US-centric view of the field.
• I offer some specific thoughts/advice/self-denunciation on what has been most valuable in terms of process, feedback, and collaboration in making my own research.
• The third, current, wave is moving toward crafting a broader “political violence” field. This is overall a good thing that explores exciting new areas that are related to but move beyond the central questions of the first two waves. It also, however, reflects the challenges of a saturated core of the civil war research area – it’s harder and harder to make major new contributions in areas that were central to the field 20 or even 10 years ago. This creates distinctive challenges for new entrants, and puts on onus on more senior scholars to encourage and reward innovation and new directions by younger researchers.
• The subfield’s evolution shows a blend of intellectual innovation with direct responses to real-world political events, an interaction that extends back to the 1950s (when places like RAND and scholars like the modernization theorists responded to wars in Algeria, Malaya, and French Indochina by investigating sources of rebellion).
• More embarrassingly, re-reading the abstract for the first time in awhile shows how much I apparently love to use some variant of the word “broad”!

A valuable map from the newest (November 25, 2023) Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar Insight Email:

I’ve been keeping an eye on Myanmar’s re-escalated civil war as the anti-regime insurgency/ies seem to be gaining steam. Anthony Davis has a new Asia Times piece arguing that the balance is shifting toward the opposition:

“There is no denying these baseline facts. However, the now widespread interpretation of a stalemated conflict that they have encouraged remains conceptually facile, analytically lazy and, in terms of encouraging shoulder-shrugging inaction on the part of regional governments, dangerously flawed. 

It confuses a purported military stasis with what attention to ground detail and historical precedent indicates is something entirely different and far more complex: an inevitably protracted but dynamic conflict in which the current imbalance in armaments imposes – unsurprisingly  – a temporary military stand-off around major urban centers.

Such stand-offs litter the histories of guerrilla conflicts in Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia and other old Cold War theaters.

Serious analysis indicates that in Myanmar today, as in those struggles, rural-based insurgency involves a wider and constantly shifting interplay of military, political, economic and ultimately psychological factors. That fluid mix translates into an overarching trajectory of conflict in which one side is gaining advantage, however incremental, over the other.

In this sense, the war’s trajectory through 2023 has become clear in a manner that was not apparent in the first two years of the conflict, but which should now serve to dispel any analytical fog. In most key respects, it is a trajectory that favors forces opposed to the Naypyidaw regime. . . . .

Myanmar’s neighbors and the international community more generally would be well-advised to prepare diplomatic, humanitarian and judicial responses for a morning-after in which a smooth transition to a new federal-democratic order would hardly be guaranteed.”

In The Diplomat, Ksaw Hsan Hlaing and Naing Lin provide a detailed overview of the current battlelines:

““Operation 1027” has limited objectives and a regional scale, and its outcome is still too early to determine conclusively. However, it is undeniable that this military operation could have nationwide consequences. Since the military coup in early 2021, Myanmar has found itself in a precarious political situation, with the general population consistently demanding significant and critical change in the country.

Currently, neither the junta nor the pro-democracy forces appear poised to achieve their objectives in the short term, resulting in the sort of military and political deadlock that Francis Fukuyama once described as “dysfunctional equilibrium.” As a result, “Operation 1027” could potentially break the current stalemate in Myanmar’s military and political landscape. There are three key aspects to consider when observing the unfolding ongoing military operation in northern Myanmar.

First, the outcomes of the 3BHA operation will serve as a litmus test for the real military capability of the post-coup military junta. In recent months, many different arguments have been presented concerning the strength of the junta’s military. Some underestimate its strength and capability, while others overstate it. However, it seems the military events unfolding in northern Shan State will offer a real assessment of the junta’s military strength. A loss for the junta could bolster the confidence of opposition resistance forces, potentially leading to the further weakening or even the downfall of the current regime. Conversely, if the junta can save the situation, it could also signal that the end of the military dictatorship in Myanmar remains a distant dream.

Second, the current intensive armed clashes could also have further ramifications on other regions of the country, especially in Rakhine State in western Myanmar. Since the last de facto ceasefire between the AA and the Myanmar military in November 2022, there has been relative stability in the area, with the arrival of Cyclone Mocha on May 14 further lessening the possibility of armed clashes between the two-armed groups.

Given the involvement of the AA in the current military operation, it remains to be seen how the junta leadership will respond to the AA forces within Rakhine State. It is likely that neither the junta nor the AA will want to open another front at this point in time. However, recent weapon and artillery tests by the military in Rakhine have increased tensions and this could lead to unintended consequences. It is also interesting to see how other revolutionary groups might capitalize on the outbreak of fighting in Shan State to advance their own agendas.

Finally, the current campaign will reveal a lot about a possible change in China’s role in Myanmar’s armed politics and conflicts. The current military operations are primarily taking place in areas close to the border with China, and the fact that road blockages by the 3BHA forces will have negative impacts on the trade between the two countries. While China traditionally prefers stability along its borders, it has expressed frustration with the online gambling and fraud operations, which enjoy the protection of the junta’s militias and Border Guard Forces, including the group that controls the Kokang Self-Administered Zone.”