Author: pstaniland

The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s regime over the summer is one of the most dramatic events in the recent history of South Asia. I’m not a Bangladesh expert, so decided my main value-added might be to wait for some initial patterns to emerge and put the case in a broader comparative perspective. My conclusions are admittedly pretty caveated and ambiguous: Bangladesh is much better positioned than a 2011 Libya or 1990 Yugoslavia to manage dramatic revolution/political change, but there are a number of serious dangers ahead that could undermine a successful democratic transition. I identify several of these dangers, as well as the open foreign policy questions at hand. There are no hot takes to be found, but hot takes are rarely helpful anyways. The piece is here with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s South Asia Program.

With the ~1980 Canon nFD 50mm f1.4:

I’m pleased that a new article – coauthored with Basil Bastaki and Bryan Popoola – is out in International Security:

Stabilizing Civil Wars without Peacekeeping: Evidence from South Asia 

Peacekeeping is helpful in resolving civil wars, but there is little chance of peacekeeping operations or other international peace-building interventions for many conflicts. How do internal wars stabilize in the absence of meaningful international involvement? Two key factors, the government’s political space for bargaining and the relative power of armed groups, help to explain when it is possible to reach either stable cooperation between states and armed groups or negotiated settlements. We analyze three conflict trajectories—“long-term limited cooperation” arrangements, state incorporation or disarmament, and ongoing conflict—to show that the paths to stabilization are often ethically fraught and empirically complicated but exist even when international involvement is off the table. We use quantitative and qualitative data to study the relationships between armed groups and governments in much of post-colonial South Asia, including during periods of little or no violence. Understanding these trajectories provides policymakers, analysts, and scholars with useful tools for identifying policy options and political trade-offs as they seek to reduce the human costs of war.

From a detailed Anthony Davis piece in Asia Times on the contours of the emerging battle for Mandalay:

“While highlighting the role of well-organized PDFs with strategic punch, 10.27 Phase Two has also laid bare the stark limits of Chinese influence in stemming the coming landslide.

Following the collapse of the Hai Geng ceasefire, an agreement reached in Kunming in January this year, repeated efforts to broker another cessation of hostilities in the midst of fierce battles proved predictably unsuccessful. 

All three Brothers – including the alliance’s third partner, the Arakan Army (AA) – benefit to a greater or lesser degree from cross-border connectivity with China and have been at pains to stress that they will safeguard Chinese economic and infrastructure interests.

At the same time, all three are evidently intent on prioritizing war objectives that go well beyond securing autonomy for their own regions to include supporting at various levels Bamar efforts to bring down the edifice of military dictatorship.

For its part, China is undoubtedly deeply frustrated with Senior General Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, a capricious and incompetent dictator whose 2021 coup effectively torpedoed Beijing’s long-term economic and geostrategic objectives in Myanmar.

At the same time, China has no interest in facilitating the collapse of the SAC regime, which it fears would mean either a descent into fragmentation and chaos or an interim administration in Naypyidaw centered on a NUG that Beijing views as a stalking horse for Western meddling in its backyard.

As a result, Beijing appears caught between the Scylla of the Brotherhood and aggressive PDFs it cannot rein in and the Charybdis of its support for a regime in Naypyidaw led by generals whose floundering defeats and potential collapse have set at risk years of economic and political investment in Myanmar.”

I appreciated having a chance to share some thoughts in this interview in E-International Relations on navigating the discipline of Political Science/IR, the politics of southern Asia, the relationship between scholars and policymakers, and exciting research topics.

Good David Mathieson piece on the military’s collapse in northern Myanmar:

“In a season of stunning military victories for Myanmar’s anti-military revolutionary forces, the capture of the Northern Shan State city of Lashio and the headquarters of the North-East Command is arguably the most significant. Troops of the ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and smaller ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) entered the city several days ago and claimed to have captured the command base and most of the city. It was another remarkable gain from the late-June resumption of Operation 1027 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA) of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. . . .

The military regime, the State Administration Council (SAC), has suffered a string of major military defeats over the past month. One of the other members of the 3BA, the Ta-ang National Liberation (TNLA), has also captured the major gem mining town of Mogok, and in recent days nearby Mong Mit in Shan State. These gains effectively render all of Northern Shan State under the occupation of the anti-SAC resistance. Southwest of Mogok, the 3BA allies the Mandalay People’s Defense Force have attacked military bases in Madaya Township fewer than 60 km from the major city of Mandalay. The fall of Lashio is a major development, but must be cast in the broader context of a collapsing military in multiple locations around Myanmar. . . .

The fighting has had a devastating impact on the civilian population. Tens of thousands of residents fled the city as the siege intensified, with traffic jams on roads headed to Mandalay and to the Shan state capital of Taunngyi. This adds to the large number of internally displaced persons in the north, and will exacerbate an already dire economic situation of scarce consumer goods and hyper-inflation of rice and fuel. The SAC is also using punitive airstrikes, artillery, and UAV ‘drop bomb’ strikes on civilian targets captured by the Brotherhood. There has already been considerable damage to many towns and infrastructure, and it’s not yet clear if Lashio will be spared or pulverized. The presence of Wa troops may well be a signal to the SAC to refrain from retaliatory strikes.

There is speculation that the 3BA will be reined in by China, who brokered a ‘peace deal’ called the Haigeng Agreement back in January and have reportedly summoned the group’s leaders and SAC representatives to meet in Kunming in the coming days. The MNDAA claimed to have paused fighting at one point in July as the Chinese Communist Party Third Plenary session was held in Beijing, but there was little evidence of this. Perspectives of Operation 1027 may have to revisit assumptions of Chinese influence and intent and the questionable assertion that Chinese policy is pro-SAC. If Beijing was displeased with the renewed fighting they appear to have little assertive power over the regime or the resistance. The realpolitik for China is that it will be compelled to deal with multiple revolutionary forces in this strategic trade corridor from the border to Mandalay, as the SAC collapses in the north.”