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I recently joined the Chicago Council on Global Affairs as a nonresident senior fellow in Asia Studies. I’ll continue to also be affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment’s South Asia Program, but I was excited to also join up with my “hometown” think tank during a period of revitalization and expansion for the Council. My first piece for the Council is now up, on US-India relations under Trump – go forth and read!

This is an amazing sale from Cornell University Press (and I don’t just say that as a Cornell author and editor!); information below:

One of the fascinating big questions of contemporary politics is understanding the nature and intensity of future US-China security/economic competition – are these countries fated to intense competition or is there space for de-escalation? This has big implications for India in particular, which seemed somewhat-comfortably ensconced as a strategic partner of the US in managing China’s rise – until Trumpism hit. A US-China rapprochement might leave India on the outside looking-in as the “G2” set rules of the Asian – and global – order.

Two recent pieces offer different potential answers to how structurally-ordained US-China competition is. Mira Rapp-Hooper in Foreign Affairs writes:

” Despite his attempt to court Xi, and Xi’s own desire to take maximum advantage of Trump’s overtures, any truce will probably be temporary. China is highly unlikely to adjust its global aims, and there are many ways an attempted détente could unravel. Trump and Xi may want to calm the waters in the short term. But structural realities mean that U.S.-Chinese competition is here to stay. . . .

But the laws of international relations are ruthless. No matter what happens at their meeting, China’s ambitions will still pose the same long-term risks to American interests, American allies, and American power. The question is whether the bipartisan architects of Washington’s China consensus will act swiftly enough to protect the system they helped create.”

On the other hand, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, which does the gold-standard polling work on American attitudes toward global issues, is now finding that there has been a major shift in US public opinion toward China; Craig Kafura summarizes key findings:

“the bipartisan embrace of US-China competition no longer holds among the public, with partisan differences in perceived threats from China and disagreements on current US-China trade policy. While Republicans continue to favor limiting China’s rise, as well as reductions in trade, and view US-China trade as detrimental to US national security, Democrats have moved in the other direction. Driven by shifts among Democrats and Independents, a majority of Americans now favor a policy of cooperation and engagement with Beijing, oppose higher tariffs, and oppose cuts to bilateral trade. . . .

Since the first Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy, US-China relations have been defined by the framework of “Great Power Competition.” The administration of President Joe Biden continued this approach, framing its strategy as “invest, align, compete”—investing domestically, aligning with allies and partners, and competing with China—while also cooperating with China where interests might align. The second Trump administration has leaned heavily into the competition side of that approach, imposing high tariffs on Chinese goods and escalating the Biden administration’s attempts to cut China off from high-tech semiconductor imports. Yet the American public is moving in a different direction. The public is moving in favor of cooperation and engagement with Beijing, is less concerned about China’s rise as a threat, and is less likely now to prioritize limiting China’s influence around the world. 

In a sharp reversal from 2024, a majority of Americans (53%) now say the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China, while 44 percent prefer a policy of actively limiting the growth of China’s power. This is the first time since 2019 that a majority of Americans have preferred a policy of cooperation and engagement with China.”

Much is to be determined – US public opinion may simply be reacting against whatever Trump is up to, and more responsive to elite cues, partisan swings, etc rather than reflecting a deep, “true” underlying attitudes. But American opinion is worth paying attention to: Washington’s strategic consensus may not represent the public’s.

This is a mild evolution/broadening of my earlier Insurgency, Civil War, and Terrorism class, now including more on interstate war, criminal violence, and election/vigilante violence. Here’s the current syllabus.

For those trying to figure out what just happened in Nepal, a few of (a great many, and more to come) excellent explainers are here:

1. Akhilesh Upadhyay in the Hindustan Times: “Nepal’s uncertain course after Gen Z’s protests”
2. Pranaya Rana in Himal (and also his Substack): “Nepal’s staggering journey from Gen Z protests to new government”
3. Mahesh Kushwaha in the Indian Express: “The many revolutions that have shaped Nepal”
4. Uzair Younus interviews Ashish Pradhan on Pakistonomy (YouTube)

I also have a piece out in Journal of Democracy seeking to identify four preliminary insights from protests leading to the collapse of governments in 2025 Nepal, 2024 Bangladesh, and 2022 Sri Lanka (acknowledging that there are also big differences across them). A preview of the takeaways is below:
1. “organizationally amorphous, decentralized movements have proven to be remarkably potent tools against political establishments that lack legitimacy and whose governing institutions and ruling political parties have been hollowed out by patronage and personalism”
2. “Elections are necessary but not sufficient to reform a political system, though there is little clarity or consensus on what is needed in addition to voting. . . it is not always obvious what form the new democratic order should take for each of these protest movements”
3. “militaries have shown that they are crucially important political players. . . once militaries become a crucial force in political life, it will be difficult to get them fully back into the barracks”
4. “all three cases show how quickly internal political changes can unsettle international politics. . .forcing major powers such as China and India — which, despite their considerable influence, are often unable to control their neighbors’ domestic politics”

ISP-Myanmar just published a very valuable report, Prospective 4th-Generation Tatmadaw: Pathways to Reform or Further Regression? It offers a useful timeline and mapping of the dramatic events of November 2023-April 2024, during which the military took serious losses and armed groups made important gains, while also showing data on the stabilization and recovery since then. I further learned a lot from their mapping of the current military elite in Myanmar – who holds what positions and ranks, their ages, and who might be the next level of commanders.

This kind of “micro-level military politics” is an enduring interest of mine (i.e. this article on Pakistan I wrote with Naseemullah and Butt) but requires enormous time and detailed contextual knowledge/date that most political scientists simply don’t have. Check out the whole report.