- On the present-day, Geoffrey Macdonald studies the new generation of Bangladeshi political leaders and their views of foreign policy for a series from the National Bureau of Asian Research; some excerpts:
“Several domestic and international factors are coalescing to shape the foreign policy worldview of Bangladesh’s next generation of leaders, which has centered on more equitable international balancing. First, Bangladesh has emerged as a geopolitical swing state, which enhances its ability to hedge between regional and global powers to its advantage. . . .
Second, Bangladesh’s leaders are operating in a political environment of deep antipathy toward India, which incentivizes a foreign policy reorientation. In a 2025 survey, 60% of Bangladeshis said India has a negative impact on their country.[14] Negative perceptions of India stem from long-standing disputes over border killings, water sharing, and what many Bangladeshis view as anti-Muslim and anti-Bengali policies within India. These sentiments have intensified over the past fifteen years due to India’s political backing of Hasina and the AL. After the party’s removal from power, India’s decision to shelter Hasina, reject extradition requests, and amplify claims of anti-Hindu violence and rising extremism in Bangladesh further deepened public resentment. . . .
Third, the rise of Islamist politics has elevated politicians skeptical of India, creating political space for rebalancing Bangladesh’s foreign policy. In the February 2026 elections, Jamaat won 68 seats and received 31% of the vote, far outpacing its previous highs. Its electoral performance indicates the public’s growing openness to Islamist politics. Half of respondents in a 2025 poll said the influence of religion in politics had increased over the previous year . . . . .
U.S. foreign policy is also reshaping Bangladesh’s international perspective. Since January 2026, the Trump administration’s reduction of development assistance, uncertainty over trade and tariff policies, and broader unpredictability in foreign policy have strengthened incentives for Bangladesh to undertake a hedging strategy between major powers.. . .
Following the AL’s fall, the Yunus-led interim government previewed the distinct geopolitical direction that Bangladesh’s new parliament would take. Starting in August 2024, it continued to seek reciprocal benefits from the United States and China while creating greater distance from India.[22] The interim government sought stronger engagement with the United States and Western governments to restore international credibility, stabilize the economy, attract investment, and gain support for democratic reforms.[23] Concurrently, it maintained close economic and infrastructure ties with China, recognizing China’s importance as a major trade partner, investor, and defense supplier.[24] Although the interim government avoided a full rupture with India, it reviewed trade and transit arrangements, pushed back against Indian trade restrictions, and emphasized the need for equitable commercial ties. . . . .
Bangladesh’s new government and parliamentary players will likely continue this trend”
2. On a more historical note, this Umran Chowdhury post (part of his Bangladesh Statecraft Substack) provides a valuable chronology and summary of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s attempt to build a ruling party-state, in the form of BAKSAL (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League). This turned into a wildly counterproductive disaster. I was struck by this information on the origins of the idea:
“In the prelude to the fourth amendment, Mujib came into contact with the leaders of one party states in Africa, Europe and Asia. In 1973, he went to Algeria which was a one party state under the FLN. In Algiers, he met Fidel Castro who ruled over a one party communist state in Cuba. He also met African socialist leaders, including the founders of Senegal and Zambia who ruled over one party states in their respective countries. Mujib also met with Ba’ath Party leaders from Iraq and Syria where Arab nationalists had established one party states. In 1974, Mujib received medical treatment in the Soviet Union during the tripartite talks between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in New Delhi. The former Yugoslavia developed close ties with the new state of Bangladesh and Marshal Tito was the first head of state to visit Mujib in Dhaka. Mujib also met with Ne Win, the Burmese dictator who ruled his country with an iron fist under the banner of the Burma Socialist Programme Party. At home, Mujib’s family was clamoring for a one party state. His nephew Sheikh Moni, who headed the wartime Mujib Bahini, submitted a petition on behalf of trade unions demanding a totalitarian socialist system.”
Paul Staniland 